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UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO
Changing LegitimaCy narratives 
about ProfessionaL ethiCs 
and indePendenCe in the 1930’s 
Journal of accountancy
Abstract: The 1930s in the U.S. were marked by an economic crisis, 
governmental regulatory response, and a significant audit failure. 
This paper examines the profession’s struggle for legitimacy during 
these times through its choice of narratives regarding professional 
ethics and independence as revealed in the national professional or-
ganization’s monthly, the Journal of Accountancy. Initially “ethics is a 
state-of-mind” or narrative of character was used but transitioned to 
a more objectively determinable narrative of technique as the decade 
progressed. To counter governmental regulation, the profession at-
tempted to shift the independence discourse away from regulation of 
accountants to regulation of client companies. 
INTRODUCTION
Occupational groups that apply specialized knowledge and 
skills to complex tasks and claim to serve both their own and 
the public’s interest seek to define themselves as professionals. 
A code of ethics is one of the most important attributes defining 
a profession [Montagna, 1974] and has been termed a “unique, 
 dynamic record of the movement of an occupational group 
toward professional status” [Casler, 1964, p. 8]. This paper tem-
pers this functionalist view of the code of ethics with the con-
sideration that the effectiveness of such a code depends upon 
its reflecting cultural mores. In the process of changing the code 
of ethics in response to social and political events, professional 
groups attempt to influence members of the profession, the pub-
lic, and regulators through discourse on components of its code. 
This discourse is in the form of narratives that allow society to 
define the criteria for competence and to evaluate performance.
As such, narratives act as legitimating devices [Preston et al., 
1995].
acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Dick Fleischman and the 
two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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The form or content of these narratives changes over time, as 
does the code of ethics itself, and at the beginning of the 1930s, 
the phrase “ethics is a state of mind” [Richardson, 1931, p. 15] en-
capsulated the profession’s narrative of character. Character is “a 
core constituent of personal identity” [Preston et al., 1995, p. 521] 
to be developed through moral education both at home and at 
school. The state-of-mind of the upright individual so developed 
provided the moral guidance that could be relied upon to direct 
his or her actions in an ethical manner. A corollary to this is that 
unethical behavior resided in the flawed individual instead of in 
the profession or its self-governance and, consequently, a limited 
number of rules were needed to constitute an ethics code.
By contrast, the narrative of technique uses legal and tech-
nical rhetoric in a specialized and esoteric subject as the means 
of legitmation. In this narrative, moral guidance is replaced with 
rules and professional judgment. Preston et al.’s [1995] study of 
U.S. accountants’ professional ethics found that a 1917 narrative 
invoking the legitimacy of character had shifted by 1988 to the 
legitimacy of technique. Their study does not address when this 
shift occurred; however, the transition is apparent in discourse 
in the American Institute of Accountants’ (AIA) official maga-
zine, the Journal of Accountancy (JA), in the 1930s. 
The 1930s opened in the aftermath of economic crisis 
caused by the stock-market crash in October 1929, followed 
by the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Abbott [1988] argues that the extent of 
the shift from legitimacy of character to legitimacy of technique 
varies among professions depending upon the relative use of 
 science and social structures for legitmation. The social struc-
ture of greatest significance is regulation, and the 1930s found 
the accounting profession subject to significantly enhanced 
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
The profession was still coping with this increased regula-
tory attention when the fraud at McKesson & Robbins (M&R) 
was revealed in December 1938. This fraud was the “first time 
accounting practices were subject to significant public and 
governmental disclosure, comment, criticism and judgment” 
[Barr and Galpeer, 1987, p. 160]. The SEC held hearings with 
testimony from 12 expert witnesses from accounting firms. The 
repercussions from this fraud closed the decade and pushed the 
profession further toward the use of the narrative of technique 
to attain legitimacy. 
Auditor independence was not a component of the code 
of ethics in the 1930s; however, the JA featured considerable 
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discourse on the subject. Similar to changing legitimacy narra-
tives, independence was originally viewed as an integral part of 
character and later was conceived as an economic commodity 
[Williams, 1992]. Accountants of this era vigorously resisted in-
clusion of independence in the code not only through legitimacy 
narrative strategies, but also by reframing the independence 
discussion in terms of client regulation. Initially, reframing the 
discussion focused on regulating client-auditor relationships 
through how auditors were appointed to the engagement. In re-
sponse to the M&R fraud, accountants continued reframing the 
discussion through advocating a variety of regulations for client 
companies and education for financial-statement users. Simulta-
neously, accountants attempted to regain legitimacy through use 
of the narrative of technique as articulated through enhanced 
accounting principles and auditing methods.
This paper does not debate whether accountants were 
 professionals in the 1930s or not, but instead considers ac-
countancy to be a profession. The focus is how the accounting 
profession constructed its narratives of legitimacy and respond-
ed to increased governmental regulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
next section describes the primary sources and is followed by 
a section describing the U.S. audit environment in the 1930s, 
including the code of professional ethics. Sections on indepen-
dence as an ethical construct in the 1930s, the engagement of 
auditors, and the M&R audit failure follow. The last section pro-
vides concluding comments. 
THE JA AND ITS SPONSORING ORGANIZATION
Articles and editorials in the JA, the official publication of 
the AIA from October 1929 through 1939, are the main primary 
sources used. The history of the JA and that of its sponsoring 
organization are intertwined. While the JA had a single name 
change, its sponsoring organization went through multiple 
mergers and name changes. The JA started life as the Auditor, 
the journal of the Illinois Society of CPAs, in 1904 [Zeff, 1987]. 
The Federation of Societies of Public Accountants in the United 
States (the Federation), formed in Illinois in 1902, rivaled the 
AIA as a national organization. Robert Montgomery, in his then 
capacity as secretary of the Federation, acquired the journal 
in 1905 and renamed it the JA. The first issue was published in 
November 1905 after the Federation’s merger with the American 
Association of Public Accountants (AAPA) [Zeff, 1987]. 
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The initial issue evinced the practitioner participation 
featured throughout the magazine’s history with an article by 
Montgomery on professional standards [Zeff, 1987]. An editorial 
in the initial issue proclaimed the journal’s objective as “estab-
lishment of accountancy in law and opinion as a learned profes-
sion” and noted that “much, however, still remains to be done 
before accountancy can take the stand on the plane of medicine 
and law.” The editorial closed with three requests of its readers: 
“(1) Subscribe; (2) praise The Journal publicly and criticize us 
under the cover of a two-cent postage stamp; (3) tell us how to 
improve The Journal” [Anon., 1905, pp. 57-59].
The AAPA was organized in 1887 and primarily operated in 
New York City [Previts and Merino, 1998]. Its name changed in 
1916 to Institute of Accountants in the United States of America 
and then to the AIA in 1917 [Roberts, 1987]. Membership was 
concentrated in urbanized states, and its leaders were often 
from large, prosperous firms. Throughout the 1920s, the AIA’s 
emphasis on the independent audit distanced it from account-
ants in rural states who considered the AIA elitist [Previts and 
Merino, 1998]. In December 1921, accountants primarily located 
in the Midwest founded the American Society of Certified Public 
Accountants and had a bitter rivalry with the AIA “until threat of 
external intervention in the thirties forced unification” [Previts 
and Merino, 1998, p. 243]. The merger in 1936 left the AIA as 
the national voice for accountants in the U.S. [Montgomery, 
1936]. The AIA adopted its contemporary name, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, in 1957 [Cook, 1987] 
and continues to publish the JA monthly.
By the 1930s, the magazine’s masthead included the sub-
heading “Official Organ of the American Institute of Account-
ants” and the disclaimer: “Opinions expressed in the Journal of 
Accountancy are not necessarily endorsed by the publishers nor 
by the American Institute of Accountants. Articles are chosen 
for their general interest, but beliefs and conclusions are often 
merely those of individual authors.” This disclaimer appears to 
have been for legal purposes more than an indicator of divergent 
views. (Note that divergent views are “merely those of individual 
authors.” – emphasis added) Authors tended to come from the 
ranks of business, legal, and government leaders. The list of 
expert witnesses who testified before the SEC about the M&R 
audit failure (or “case” as the JA termed it) featured many prior 
contributors to the journal. A rebuttal article generally accom-
panied the rare article critical of accountants or some facet of 
accounting practice. The JA was used to construct narratives for 
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the profession and in so doing fulfilled its function as the “Of-
ficial Organ” of the AIA. Far from being objective, dis interested, 
or independent sources, these articles are reflective of the AIA’s 
positions and are thus good sources for the narratives this influ-
ential segment of the profession desired to communicate in its 
quest for legitimation. 
The initial editors of the JA were business academics [Zeff, 
1987], but during the decade of the 1930s, the JA had two non-
accountant, professional editors – Alphyon Richardson and John 
Carey. Richardson was a professional journalist who assumed 
the editorship in 1912 [Edwards and Miranti, 1987]. He was 
also the AIA secretary (chief of operations) until he retired from 
the post in 1930 and assumed only editorial duties [AIA, 1938]. 
Carey joined the staff of the AIA as assistant secretary after re-
ceiving his bachelor’s degree in English from Yale University in 
1925 [Zeff, 1987]. He became the AIA secretary in 1930, and in 
January 1937, he became managing editor of the JA. His tenure 
in this position lasted until 1949, after which he became edi-
tor from 1949-1954 and publisher from 1955-1966 [Zeff, 1987]. 
Both editors ran unsigned editorial columns in each issue that 
commented on the accounting issues of the day. Whether the ed-
itor wrote each editorial is problematic in Richardson’s case as 
George O. May, an AIA leader and partner in Price Waterhouse, 
may have authored many editorials published during Richard-
son’s tenure as editor [Previts and Merino, 1998].
Each issue of the JA featured editorials that were often 
lengthy with sub-headings to denote the wide-ranging topics 
covered. Commissioned works on particular topics, texts of 
speeches delivered to various professional bodies, and problems 
from previously administered CPA exams were published. As the 
decade progressed, discussions of both proposed and enacted 
governmental regulation were featured. The decade closed with 
excerpts from expert testimony before the SEC regarding the 
audit failure at M&R. As the actual words of the past are cited, it 
should be noted that the language of the 1930s was not gender-
neutral. Gender-neutral language will be used when not citing 
historical works. Those editorials and articles that pertain to 
professional ethics and the issue of auditor independence were 
examined for the type of narrative they employed.
THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDIT ENVIRONMENT 
In the 1920s, demand for accounting services increased 
significantly and brought changes “in the position of the pub-
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lic  accountant in the community” [Olive, 1929, p. 252]. These 
changes were attributed to the implementation of federal in-
come taxes in 1917, increased recognition of the importance 
of an independent accountant’s report for credit purposes, the 
merger and consolidation of small business units into larger 
corporations, and an increased amount of public ownership of 
stocks [Olive, 1929]. Montgomery [1937, p. 270], then president 
of the AIA, attributed these changes to the impact of World War 
I: “It may be urged that men killing each other has little to do 
with our profession, but it has much to do. It was the World War 
which made business cost-conscious; it was war profits which 
made tax saving attractive.”
In an editorial in November 1928, Richardson [1928, p. 359] 
noted: “The incorrigible optimism of the investing public con-
tinues. Warnings issued by authorities have no effect and the 
public buys and buys; stocks rise to a market value altogether 
out of proportion to the companies’ earnings.” The Dow Jones 
Industrials Index on December 31, 1928 was 300 points, but 
after the October 1929 crash, the Dow recovered to end the year 
at 248.5. While the change may seem small by contemporary 
standards, a drop of seven points in 1928 corresponds to a drop 
of 350 points when the Dow is at 10,000 [Wright, 2002].
The stock-market crash of October 1929 opened a period 
of economic crisis that would last through most of the 1930s. 
Previts and Merino [1998, p. 270] consider the impact of this 
period on America to be “second in importance only to the years 
1776-89 (from the War of Independence to the inauguration of 
George Washington as president).” Auditors were not blamed for 
the crash, which was instead attributed to margin buying, stock 
speculation, and manipulation of stock prices by corporations 
[Nouri and Lombardi, 2009]. 
The crash’s economic after effects caused deep decreases in 
stock prices and offerings. In 1929, new capital public offerings 
totaled $700 million a month according to the Commercial & 
Financial Chronicle [cited in Haskell, 1938]. The Dow’s lowest 
point was 41.2 points in 1932; it peaked at 194.4 in March 1937 
[Wright, 2002]. During 1936 and the first ten months of 1937, 
the public offerings shrank to $100 million a month. The mar-
ket contracted further in November and December of 1937 and 
January of 1938 to $40 million a month [Haskell, 1938]. By De-
cember 31, 1939, the Dow was at 150.2 points, a 40% decrease 
from its December 31, 1929 level [Wright, 2002].
Judge John Knox of the bankruptcy court, addressing the 
twelfth annual fall conference of the New York State Society 
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of Certified Public Accountants (NYSSCPA) in October 1934, 
reminded accountants of the impact of their work [Staub, 1936, 
p. 209]:
The power of an accountant for the service of good and 
evil is no whit less than that possessed by the lawyer 
and physician. The accountant’s nimbleness of mind 
and his dexterity of hand can reveal truth or they [sic] 
can conceal it. They may also furnish safeguards for the 
preservation and increment of the nation’s wealth; or 
they may be so used as to impoverish the land.
The “service of good and evil” is a rather heroic characterization 
of the accountant that is indicative of the lack of objective or di-
vergent views represented in the JA. The economically stringent 
times did call for prudent and well-considered financial advisors, 
accountants among them.
Companies were “moved by the exigencies of uncertain 
times” [Barton, 1933, p. 91] following the 1929 market crash 
to adopt independent audits as a business practice. Prior to the 
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, audits were voluntary for cor-
porations that were not in governmentally regulated industries. 
The NYSE required all new listings as of July 1, 1933 to have 
independent audits, citing investor regard of audits as a useful 
safeguard as the reason. A survey of the 83 largest companies in 
1933 found that 87% did have audits, and those with no audits 
were often under governmental supervision, such as banks, utili-
ties, or railroads. Seventy of the companies had outside auditors 
for an average of 18 years. To be truly valuable, the NYSE deter-
mined that audits had to be adequate in scope and the responsi-
bility of the auditor defined [Barton, 1933]. 
Although there was regulatory pressure to conduct audits, 
accountants still had to contend with some adverse client reac-
tion to audits even at the close of the decade [Retzlaff, 1939, p. 
85]: 
We are only too familiar with the attempts of some 
businessmen to restrict the scope of our engagements, 
to cut fees, and generally belittle the accountant’s work. 
The objectionable practice of asking for bids is an out-
growth of this attitude. To many executives, audits are 
just a necessary evil – why spend money for reports on 
last year’s operations which, after all, are ‘water over the 
dam?’ Were it not for bankers and stockholders, a good 
many audits would never be authorized.
Passage of the Securities Acts gave CPAs a “legally defined 
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social obligation: to assist in creating and sustaining investor 
confidence in the public capital markets” [Previts and Merino, 
1998, p. 274]. They deem this social obligation necessary to jus-
tify the claim to professional status. Attainment of the “learned 
profession” status of medicine and law was a stated objective in 
the initial issue of the JA [Anon., 1905]. Law, medicine, and ac-
counting are professions “in which the articles offered for sale 
are advice, counsel, and personal abilities” [Richardson, 1936, 
p. 316], with all of these based on both the technical and the 
intrinsic, moral components of the practitioner. As law and 
medicine had codes of professional ethics, accounting likewise 
had an ethical code as a legitimating device.
PROESSIONAL ETHICS AT THE DAWN OF THE DECADE
By June 1931, the AIA had formulated ethics rules that 
covered 12 basic areas but did not include independence. These 
rules comprise the self-regulatory base line at the beginning of 
the decade and are the context for the narrative surrounding 
professional ethics that appeared in the JA. At this time, the 
ethics is a “state of mind” concept was still held and “was also 
used to limit and then justify the small number of written rules” 
[Preston et al., 1995, p. 518]. The areas covered by the rules are 
as follows (the full text appears as Appendix A) [Richardson, 
1931, pp. 155-159]:
 1. use of the title “Member American Institute of Ac-
countants”
 2. certification of statements which contained essen-
tial misstatements
 3. prohibition of a non-AIA member from practicing 
in the name of a member
 4. commissions
 5. incompatible occupations
 6. certification of statements not verified under super-
vision of an AIA member
 7. efforts to secure legislation without notification of 
the Institute
 8. solicitation or encroachment on the practice of an-
other member




12. participation in activities of educational institutions 
whose promotional activities were discreditable to 
the profession.
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The rules are listed in the order of adoption and reflect 
the profession’s strong need for self-regulation instead of a 
systematic analysis of ethical issues. The code’s principles were 
commandment-like in nature as they were phrased as “thou 
shalt not” prohibitions. They did not attempt to imbue a higher 
purpose in accountants since character or the accountant’s state 
of mind was considered sufficient to provide moral guidance.
The ideals of a gentleman were an underlying linchpin for 
rationalizing the narrative of character [Haber, 1991]. The pro-
fessions whose status accountants aspired to attain shared these 
ideals: “Every lawyer, every physician, every accountant, and 
 every man in every other professional field should be imbued 
with a spirit of righteousness and the ideals of a gentleman,” 
Richardson [1936, pp. 313-314] stated in an “Ethics in Retro-
spect” editorial published in the JA’s twenty-fifth anniversary 
issue. However, he noted that individuals who did not possess 
these gentlemanly ideals were entering the profession, but that 
ethics could be learned:
It has been said repeatedly (and the remark, we believe, 
was originally made by an eminent member of the ac-
counting profession) that ethics is a state of mind and 
he who has it not will never acquire it. This is not liter-
ally true, because it is well known that some of the ac-
countants who have entered the profession without a 
conception of its real character have been so impressed 
by the importance of observing the code of ethics that 
they have gradually acquired a conception of the pro-
fession totally different from that which they possessed 
at the time of their entering in. 
Character as an essential professional quality was still advanced, 
but the ability to learn aspects of the profession, previously 
deemed impossible to learn, was acknowledged. 
The public interest of the profession is intertwined with 
the private or self-interest aspect of professional ethics [Parker, 
1994]. Public-interest objectives are to protect society by safe-
guarding the economic interests of clients and third parties, de-
lineate client-profession relations, and orient the profession to-
wards social responsibility. Parker [1994, p. 509] defines private 
interest as “the latent motivation of ethical codes to protect the 
interests of the professional accounting body corporate and its 
individual members.” Elements of the private interest are self-
control, development of self-professional authority, definition 
and maintenance of exclusiveness, and preservation of socio-
economic status and political power. 
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Only one strong, primarily public-interest rule existed in the 
1931 Code – certification of statements which contained essen-
tial misstatements (#2). As bad audit work would impair an ac-
countant’s reputation, there was also a private-interest element. 
Just compensation of the accountant was the private-interest 
aspect served by rules on commissions (#4) and contingent fees 
(#10). These rules also had a public-interest aspect as the sepa-
ration of payment from work outcome potentially reduced bias. 
The contingent-fee rule was passed in 1919 in response to the 
Treasury Department’s threat to regulate the many contingency-
fee-basis, self-styled “tax experts” who opened shop after the 
federal income tax was enacted [Previts and Merino, 1998]. 
The private interest of self-regulation of the profession was 
evidenced in the rules on solicitation or encroachment on the 
practice of another member (#8) and offers of employment to 
employees of fellow members (#9). Both rules constrained com-
petition for clients and employees within the profession. Rule 
#7, efforts to secure legislation without notification of the Insti-
tute, serves the private interest of maintaining political power. It 
also established the AIA as the sole custodian of narrative with 
regulators and legislators. Exclusivity of audit services was the 
private interest established by the rules on use of the title “Mem-
ber American Institute of Accountants”(#1), prohibition of a 
non-AIA member to practice as a member (#3), and certification 
of statements not verified under supervision of an AIA member 
(#6). 
Maintenance of social status was the private interest served 
by the rules dealing with incompatible occupations (#5), adver-
tisements (#11), and participation in the activities of educational 
institutions whose promotional activities were discreditable to 
the profession (#12). Professional advertising was condemned 
since law and medicine, the professions to whose social status 
accountants aspired, did not allow advertising. Richardson 
[1936, p. 315] averred that “no man who is a gentleman can 
claim for himself any superiority over his fellow.” 
The lack of an independence rule may be explained because 
independence was considered “intrinsic to the character of the 
professional and not easily subject to formal definition” [Preston 
et al., 1995, p. 526]. Alternatively, Parker’s [1994] private-interest 
model of professional accounting ethics holds that creation of 
a professional mystique that renders the profession immune 
to evaluation by outsiders to be a crucial, private-interest goal. 
If only the accountant could ascertain independence, then the 
profession had sole claim to evaluation of a central facet of its 
10
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operation. Absence of an independence rule served the private 
interest of insulation from external monitoring. 
INDEPENDENCE
Auditor independence was not in the code of professional 
ethics, but it was the subject of considerable discourse in the 
JA and of regulatory attention throughout the 1930s. The stock-
market crash “may be viewed as a catalyst, mandating some 
form of action to restore confidence in the securities markets” 
[Merino et al., 1987]. Frederick Hurdman [1931, p. 303], then 
president of the AIA, attempted to improve the perception of the 
profession by introducing in 1931 the following resolution man-
dating auditor independence from the client: 
Whereas the relations between a client in the form 
of a corporation and the auditor for that corporation 
should be one of entire independence, and 
Whereas it does not appear to be practicable for the 
auditor consistently to hold a dual relationship as audi-
tor and executive of the corporation, and
Whereas the public interest and confidence will 
best be preserved by complete separation of these two 
functions, therefore be it
Resolved that the maintenance of a dual relation-
ship of director or officer of the corporation while act-
ing as auditor of that corporation is against the best 
interest of the public and the profession and tends to 
destroy that independence of action considered essen-
tial in the relationship between client and auditor.
This resolution, which focused on activities and relationships 
to remove external indicators of lack of independence, was de-
feated in 1932. However, it did not address the full range of in-
compatible relationships since ownership of an audit client was 
not included. The profession’s failure to pass the proposal was a 
strong indication of the depth of adherence to independence as 
character. Although not enacted, the resolution indicated an ac-
knowledgment of stakeholders in financial reporting since public 
interest and confidence were cited as reasons for the adoption of 
an independence rule.
It is difficult to reconcile acceptability of stock ownership in 
a client and incompatible relationships with the independence 
aspect of the 1930s ethics code’s ban on commissions. The pro-
hibition included giving commissions to secure engagements 
and receiving commissions from stationery purveyors and other 
providers of services to clients. Commissions were prohibited 
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as “a professional man who would give his best services must 
be absolutely uninfluenced by external matters” [Franke, 1930, 
p. 360]. Ironically, the profession acknowledged the possibility 
of influence or loss of independence from recommending a 
seller of business products but simultaneously felt an owner-
ship interest in a client would not create a similar conflict. The 
narrative of character was used to explain the inconsistent posi-
tions. Hurdman [1931, p. 304] noted that bankers found a dual 
relationship of auditor and director, or auditor and officer, to be 
troubling unless “the reputation of the accountant involved was 
of such a high character that they felt reasonably certain the 
dual relationship did not work harmfully.”
Use of insider information in reorganizations, underwrit-
ings, new issues, and stock dividends was also deemed to reduce 
independence as it placed the accountant in the position of 
receiving a favor from management. Hurdman [1931, p.304] 
concluded that no fixed rule regarding stock ownership could 
be instituted but did note that the accountant “should keep in 
mind the necessity at all times of preserving an independent 
relationship and so arranging his investments that he does not 
take advantage of the public or permit any hoped-for gain in 
market values to influence in any degree his impartial review 
and presentation of the facts.” The amount of ownership interest 
should be immaterial to the accountant and was to be left to the 
accountant’s individual discretion. Hurdman [1931] advanced 
the notion that it was unlikely on a practical basis that an ac-
countant would risk potential future earnings and goodwill by 
making an inappropriate decision swayed by stock ownership in 
a client. This view is consistent with the ethics is a state-of-mind 
argument of the narrative of character in which independence 
was an intrinsic characteristic of the accountant. 
Then, as now, the SEC did not endorse independence as 
character but instead favored an objectively determinable ap-
proach. SEC rule 650(b) was instituted in 1934 and read as fol-
lows [Carey, 1937b, p. 244]:
The commission will not recognize any certified ac-
countant or public accountant as independent who 
is not in fact independent. An accountant will not be 
considered independent with respect to any person in 
whom he has any substantial interest, direct or indirect, 
or with whom he is connected as an officer, employee, 
promoter, underwriter, trustee, partner, director, or per-
son performing similar functions. 
The AIA passed an independence standard in 1934 when 
12
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pressure from government and the financial press made its pas-
sage almost involuntary [Previts and Merino, 1979]. The AIA’s 
adopted version of the independence standard read [Carey, 
1937b, p. 243]:
Resolved, That no member or associate shall certify the 
financial statements of any enterprise financed in whole 
or in part by the public distribution of securities if he is 
himself the actual or beneficial owner of a substantial 
financial interest in the enterprise or if he is committed 
to acquire such an interest. 
The SEC rule was more comprehensive than that adopted 
by the AIA in the same year as it covered both financial and 
employment relationship aspects. Both substantial ownership 
of a client and incompatible relationships (e.g., director) were 
banned. The profession still endorsed independence primarily 
as character or a personal attribute since the dual relationship 
of auditor and director was not banned in the AIA standard. 
Neither did the profession address incompatible services offered 
by accountants.
The character/intrinsic-moral-attribute approach to in-
dependence and ethics was still held by accountants after the 
Securities Acts. After the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, 
Frederick Andrews [1934, p. 59] wrote: 
Rarely in this country does the public accountant have 
such a relation to the stockholders as to give him other 
than a moral duty to them, and it is to his everlasting 
credit that he recognizes this moral duty so clearly that 
he is not infrequently required to suffer direct financial 
loss in the performance of it.
The reference to the accountant’s “moral duty” harkens back to 
the character narrative. A self-recognized moral duty but not a 
legal or professional one was acknowledged, thus illustrating the 
degree to which accountants urged the public to rely on their 
moral commitment to serve the public interest.
While specialized education enhances further technical 
development and thus is a necessary component of legitimacy 
of technique, the narrative of character was not abandoned in 
the classroom. Warren Nissley [1937, p. 114] lectured at the 
new School of Public Accountancy at Columbia University. He 
told his accounting students on December 8, 1936 that the most 
important of seven essential traits for a successful account-
ing career was a character with the highest ethical standards. 
Although a highly ethical accountant is necessary for the pro-
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tection of the public interest, ethical behavior was also seen to 
have a private-interest aspect. It was noted that for “a public 
accountant to perform his work dishonestly would be to commit 
vocational suicide.” 
The SEC did not accept this argument and held a rather 
skeptical attitude expressed by James Landis, then SEC chair-
man, in a speech: “The impact of almost daily tilts with ac-
countants, some of them called leaders in their profession, often 
leaves little doubt that their loyalties to management are stron-
ger than their sense of responsibility to the investor” [quoted 
in Nissley, 1937, p. 101]. This reaction had some validity as the 
profession articulated its disagreements with the SEC in the JA 
on the topics of dual auditor-director relationships and owner-
ship interests in clients. 
The profession considered that there were three accept-
able exceptions to the ban on dual auditor and director status. 
These three exceptions were in the cases of (1) closely held 
corporations, (2) auditors employed by a bank to make a credit 
examination, and (3) non-profit organizations [Carey, 1937a]. 
The profession’s conclusion on the dual relationship issue was 
that “it can not flatly be said to be wrong in all cases, is clearly 
a thing to be avoided whenever possible” [Carey, 1937a, p. 245]. 
The individual accountant’s character was the factor that would 
make the dual relationships acceptable in some cases, thus in-
volving once again the narrative of character.
Both the SEC and the AIA versions of independence banned 
a “substantial” financial/ownership stake in a client, but exactly 
what constituted “substantial” was a subject of debate. In the 
SEC’s second accounting release issued on May 6, 1937, the 
Commission stated its position on independence. In addition 
to reiterating its opposition to auditor dual relationships, the 
release indicated that stock ownership in excess of 1% of an 
 accountant’s net worth would impair independence [Broad, 
1938]. The profession did not consider this a fair rule since 
accountants were “recruited from those in moderate circum-
stances whose incomes are relatively large in relation to their 
fortunes” [Carey, 1937b, p. 410]. The word “independence” did 
not appear in the code of ethics until issuance of Opinion No. 
12: Independence by the AICPA’s Division of Professional Ethics 
in 1961 [AICPA, 1970]. Adherence to the personal attribute ap-
proach spanned the Atlantic. Upon learning of the ownership 
prohibition, English accountants expressed surprise that the 
Americans would “permit the inference that their integrity might 
be impaired by the dual relationship” [Carey, 1975, p. 80].
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ENGAGEMENT OF AUDITORS
While the SEC attempted to achieve auditor independence 
by regulating the profession, the profession’s own independence 
efforts were aimed at regulation of the client through altering 
how auditors were appointed. Debate centered on two methods 
of appointment of auditors, termed the director and the share-
holder (or English) methods [Richardson, 1932]. The director 
method was predominately used in the U.S. The directors, an 
elected board of management, appointed and compensated the 
auditors without shareholder oversight. The shareholder  method 
was a legal requirement in England where the auditors were 
elected at the annual meeting by the shareholders themselves. 
The shareholders were considered the true owners of the com-
pany and were empowered to select their independent investiga-
tor “who might almost be called also an arbiter” [Richardson, 
1932, p. 321]. 
Unlike SEC rule 650(b)’s ban on substantial ownership 
and incompatible relationships, the shareholder method did 
not create constraints on the accountant but instead improved 
the auditor’s position vis-à-vis management and the board of 
directors. The focus of discussion shifted from regulation of the 
accountant to regulation of the client company without further 
limitations on accountants themselves. While the discourse 
concerning independence utilized the narrative of character, 
discussion regarding engagement of auditors used the narra-
tive of technique. In an editorial in the JA, the AIA endorsed the 
shareholder plan in 1932. It was noted that when the auditor “is 
engaged by the people who are under investigation his personal 
independence may be jeopardized and the affairs of the corpora-
tion itself may not always be given the complete, objective analy-
sis which they should have” [Richardson, 1932, p. 326].
Some regulatory sentiment concurred with the AIA position 
as expressed by Milo Maltbie, chairman of the New York Public 
Service Commission [Barton, 1933, p. 98]:
Auditors who are selected by officer are much less in-
clined to be independent than those selected by stock-
holders, which is the English plan. In other words, the 
value of an ‘independent audit’ depends more upon the 
standing of the auditors and the thoroughness of their 
investigation than upon the fact that the auditors are 
not upon the regular staff of the utility which they are 
investigating. 
However, by the end of 1933, only Massachusetts and Pennsyl-
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vania had enacted corporation laws that required the auditor 
to be selected by the stockholders. The United States Steel 
Corporation had voluntarily had its auditors selected by the 
stock holders, an action that was seen to anticipate “future emer-
gencies by establishing the auditors as independent advisors of 
the stockholder, co-equal for that purpose with the management 
itself” [Andrews, 1934, p. 60]. 
The shareholder method had additional independence 
advantages. The auditors had the right to attend and address 
the shareholders meeting and state their case before being dis-
missed [Hunt, 1935]. Under the director method, there was no 
forum in which an auditor who resigned an engagement due to 
disagreements with management could explain the reason for 
the resignation [Nissley, 1937]. In England, the auditor was also 
obligated by law to include in his/her certificate whether or not 
the directors had satisfied the auditor’s needs for information 
[Hunt, 1935], thereby reducing the possibility of audit-scope 
limitations. The auditor also had a statutory right to access the 
books at any time and to require the officers and directors to 
respond to auditor inquiries [Carey, 1938].
Some of the impetus for discussion of the English method 
came from the profession’s desire to avoid governmental or 
bureaucratic control of auditing and auditors. A governmental 
commission to appoint auditors was viewed as unlikely to be 
free from political interference with a corresponding negative 
impact on an auditor’s independence [Hunt, 1935]. The share-
holder method was also viewed as a means to improve audit 
quality as “the English practice of fixing the auditor’s fee at an-
nual meetings, might tend to remove restrictions on the scope 
of an auditor’s examination, from which he occasionally suffers 
because of the management’s desire to reduce expenses” [Carey, 
1938, pp. 356-357]. 
The appointment of auditors was revisited in expert-witness 
testimony before the SEC regarding the M&R case and neces-
sary accounting and auditing reforms [Anon., 1939c]. George 
Bailey testified that toward the later part of the 1930s, the direc-
tors initially selected auditors but managing officers reappointed 
auditors subsequently [Anon., 1939c]. Witnesses generally 
agreed that engagement by the board of directors or an audit 
committee was preferable to engagement by management. This 
view was shared by a committee established by the NYSSCPA to 
examine audit procedures in the wake of the M&R audit failure 
[Stempf, 1939].
Samuel Broad chaired the AIA’s committee that published 
16
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 37 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
111Roberts, 1930s Ethics and Independence
Examination of Financial Statements by Independent Public 
Accountants in 1936 which represented authoritative audit 
guidance at the time of the M&R audit. He noted that the share-
holder method “is not a panacea because presumably under our 
American practice the stockholders, who support the manage-
ment, either by giving them their proxies, or by voting for their 
continuance, would probably confirm the auditor of the man-
agement’s choice” [quoted in Anon., 1939c p. 355-356].
THE M&R AUDIT FAILURE AND  
THE NARRATIVE OF TECHNIQUE
December 31, 1937 was the date of the last financial state-
ments issued prior to the revelation of the audit failure at M&R. 
This fraud came to light in late 1938 and engendered consider-
able public outcry that startled accountants [Carey, 1939a, p. 
65]:
Like a torrent of cold water the wave of publicity raised 
by the McKesson & Robbins case has shocked the ac-
countancy profession into breathlessness. Accustomed 
to relative obscurity in the public prints, accountants 
have been startled to find their procedures, their prin-
ciples, and their professional standards the subject of 
sensational and generally unsympathetic headlines.
While accountants were disconcerted by the public’s reaction, 
the fraud was far from a dry, technical problem. Initial reports 
of missing funds in the crude drug division run personally by 
company president, F. Donald Coster, were followed by the 
revelation that Coster was the false identity of a career fraud-
ster, Philip Musica. Faced with an increase in his bail, Coster 
committed suicide [New York Times, 1938b]. Strong physical 
resemblances led to the discovery that his three brothers used 
aliases to collude in the fraud and that two of the brothers had 
significant posts at M&R [New York Times, 1938d]. Allegations 
of Coster’s arms dealing, bootlegging, and blackmail by several 
people who knew his real identity followed. 
Amid the human-interest aspects was a financial fraud case 
that involved $19 million in fictitious assets, approximately 
one-fourth of the total assets shown on the financial statements 
[Vanasco et al., 2001]. While observation of inventory was not 
yet required, Price, Waterhouse & Co., M&R’s auditors, checked 
the “inventory of every other department with extreme diligence, 
[but] they accepted the inventory of the crude drug department 
on the statement of the company officers in charge” [New York 
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Times, 1938c]. The crude drug unit inventories and the Cana-
dian warehouses in which they were supposedly stored were 
non-existent [New York Times, 1938a]. 
Receivables were not confirmed as “either Coster said they 
were not necessary or because his success made them seem un-
necessary” [New York Times, 1939a]. Coster’s files contained a 
copy of “private and confidential” audit instructions issued by 
Price, Waterhouse & Co. that “laid bare the scope and opera-
tions as well as the schedules that must be drawn up to satisfy 
the auditors” [New York Times, 1939b]. In testimony before the 
SEC, Ralph Thorn, the in-charge for the M&R audit, stated 
the audit instructions were given to the M&R controller as re-
quested before each annual audit to show Price Waterhouse was 
not  doing work for the sake of increasing the audit fee.
M&R was the first landmark case in establishing U.S. audit 
evidence standards [Vanasco et al., 2001] and set the precedent 
for the SEC’s relationship with the AIA over audit standard-
setting policy. This fraud raised concerns about “the adequacy 
of audit procedures and financial reports at a time when post-
depression investor confidence was just beginning to be restored 
in the stock market” [Previts and Flesher, 1994, p. 222]. While 
the fraud reduced the value of M&R’s stock, it did not have a 
de pressive impact on stock-market prices as a whole [Wright, 
2002].
The accounting profession’s response to negative reaction 
by the public and regulators was to engage in a narrative that 
emphasized the scientific, rational, and technical aspects of 
accountancy rather than the character narrative used by the 
profession at the start of the decade. The M&R scandal was 
such that a character narrative was rendered unsupportable and 
unlikely to be effective. The AIA’s press release stated the “case 
was an extraordinary one in which there was testimony indicat-
ing collusive fraud on the part of high officers and the forging of 
accounting records.” The press release framed the issue as “the 
problem of auditing was to find means of affording adequate 
protection at a cost which would not constitute an undue bur-
den on honestly administered companies” [Carey, 1939b, p. 66].
Upon election as commissioner of the SEC, Jerome Frank 
issued a statement to the press that, “We want to be sure that 
the public never has reason to lose faith in the reports of pub-
lic accountants. To this end the independence of the public 
account ant must be preserved and strengthened and standards 
of thoroughness and accuracy protected” [Carey, 1939d, p. 
2]. Although the commissioner referred to independence as 
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a key  issue, independence was not a key feature in the expert 
testimony from hearings before the SEC that the JA published 
in three succeeding issues starting in April 1939. Instead the 
profession’s experts focused on (1) implementation of a natural 
business year, (2) early notification of the auditor’s appointment, 
(3) increased explication of accounting standards, (4) a change 
in the form of the audit report, and (5) education of the public 
about what the audit signifies [Anon., 1939a, b, c]. All of these 
points focus on techniques rather than moral or ethical aspects 
of accounting practice. The client company and the public are 
the focus of the suggested reforms. 
The natural business year is “a fiscal year which will close 
at that month-end which has been shown by experience over the 
years to be the one at which there is the lowest ebb of activity” 
[Anon., 1939b, p. 280]. C.O. Wellington testified before the SEC 
that adoption of the natural business year “would contribute as 
much, and perhaps more, than any other one change toward 
improving auditing practice” [Anon., 1939c, p. 357]. Accounts 
receivable and inventory fraud figured prominently in the M&R 
case, and it was considered that their balances would be lowest 
at the natural business year-end. Low balances would reduce 
the audit work on these accounts and reduce their percentage 
impact on the balance sheet.
The audit had to be completed after the closing of the books 
and before the stockholders’ meeting, dates that were set by the 
company’s charter at the suggestion of the company’s attorneys 
[Anon., 1939b]. Scheduling the audit at the lowest point in the 
business cycle, the natural business year-end, would facilitate 
completion of the audit in a timely manner. The natural business 
year was deemed to allow accountants to manage better their 
practices by a more even allocation of work throughout the year. 
Staffing would be improved as auditors would be able to main-
tain a more constant staff, attract staff of greater ability, and re-
quire fewer temporary staff. The cost of audits would be reduced 
as well [Anon., 1939c]. Enhanced credit analysis of financial 
statements by banks was also claimed as all companies within a 
particular industry would be received at a non-peak time [Anon., 
1939c]. The cure-all-ills claims for the natural business year 
are reminiscent of the profession’s claims for the shareholder 
 method of auditor appointment; however, neither item was likely 
to be the panacea the profession claimed. Both the shareholder 
method and the natural business year are evidence of narratives 
focused on technique that directed the postulated change away 
from the accountant’s personal and professional conduct as the 
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means to cope with negative publicity and calls for reforms in 
the accounting profession.
The need for development and codification of accounting 
principles was reflected in the state of financial reporting as 
described by John Haskell [1938, pp. 296, 298], a member of 
the NYSE, who noted that “the annual reports of some are so 
brief that they could be printed on a postage stamp.” Further, 
some companies “have been unable to describe their practice as 
to depreciation as a policy, for the simple reason that they had 
none.” Frank Shallenberger’s [1939, p. 267] speech in October 
1939 noted “the chief obligation of the profession to the public 
at the present time is the clarification of accounting principles.” 
While clear accounting principles were important, intangible 
personal characteristics of the accountant were deemed impor-
tant as well. “No statement of principles can replace the good 
judgment and integrity of the professional accountant any more 
than floodlights and the radio beacon can be substituted for the 
experience and skill of the pilot. They can both serve as great 
aids to him” [Haskell, 1938, p. 300].
In statements that presage the expectation gap of the 1970s, 
the profession lamented that the public neither understood the 
meaning of the audit report nor what accountants do. The lack 
of understanding revealed “the growing tendency of the public 
to expect more from the certified public accountant than he can 
deliver” [Stempf, 1939, p. 23]. The public, it was felt, did not 
understand that the financial statements are the representation 
of the client rather than the accountant, and “that accountants 
merely express an opinion – expert to be sure – rather than as-
certain inexorable facts” [Seidman, 1939, p. 120]. The problem 
was mainly framed as an educational or publicity issue that 
would benefit the profession if accountants would not be asked 
to perform functions to which they were not prepared to at-
test. Usefulness in the capital markets of public understanding 
of the audit certificate was also recognized: “The falling tree in 
the forest produces no sound if there is no ear to hear it; the 
painter creates no art if there is no audience to appreciate it; the 
accountant fails in his function if he does not convey true and 
sound reports which can be understood and used for the pur-
poses for which they are intended” [Wilcox, 1939, p. 152].
The narrative of technique was invoked strongly to regain 
the profession’s legitimacy after this large and publicity generat-
ing audit failure. While rhetoric regarding accounting principles, 
audit procedures, and changes to natural fiscal year-ends were 
featured in the SEC hearings testimony, the JA cautioned that 
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character was necessary as well: “It must be understood that an 
audit report is the professional opinion of the accountant who 
submits it and that its value is in direct proportion to his person-
al competence and integrity” [Carey, 1939d, p. 194]. Technique 
trumps character as competence, a component of technical 
qualifications and accuracy, is listed before integrity, a personal 
moral component of the individual accountant’s character.
CONCLUSION
Print media was a primary means of communication in the 
1930s, and the JA articulated issues that concerned the profes-
sion as defined primarily by leaders of its professional organi-
zation. The monthly JA was a serious news source about the 
profession. Printing the text of speeches given at professional 
meetings increased communication with the AIA’s national 
membership. Both editors used their editorial platform to en-
gage in dialog with external institutions. Carey’s editorials in 
particular responded to regulators’ public statements. The AIA 
was the surviving organization in the consolidation of profes-
sional associations that concluded in 1936, and the JA attempted 
to create a national, unified voice to cope with economic uncer-
tainties and regulatory pressures. 
Alteration of narrative types did not drive the editor change 
at the beginning of 1937, but the type of narrative changed at 
about the same time. Richardson’s editorship started in 1912 
and covered most of the early period in Preston et al.’s [1995] 
study that found the narrative of character to be the profession’s 
legitimacy strategy. Richardson advocated the ethics is a state-
of-mind tenet in his JA editorials. His JA twenty-fifth anniversary 
editorial noted “the very substance of professional life depends 
upon adherence at all times to the moral code” [Richardson, 
1936, p. 313]. However, this editorial also included comments 
indicating a transition to the narrative of legitimacy. Carey as-
sumed the editorship after the economic crisis of 1929 and the 
regulatory watershed of the Securities Acts. While Carey’s writ-
ings acknowledge elements of character, these two events made 
the narrative of character less viable as his editorials increas-
ingly turned to the narrative of technique. 
Transition to the narrative of technique was accelerated 
when the M&R audit failure occurred with its attendant nega-
tive publicity in the mainstream press. The profession reacted 
with discourse that focused attention away from the accountant 
as a person toward external professional elements, such as the 
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scientific and technical expertise of its members. There was no 
mention of any aspect of character in the portion of the nearly 
1,500 pages of expert testimony before the SEC that the JA 
selected for publication. Expertise used on behalf of the public 
formed the narrative that validated the legitimacy of the profes-
sion. The profession also proposed regulatory changes to deflect 
regulation of the profession toward regulation of client com-
panies. Reframing regulatory discussion diminished criticism of 
the profession while attempting to establish a better position for 
the profession with client companies.
Advocacy of the shareholder or English method of audi-
tor appointment was the profession’s first attempt to regulate 
the client during the 1930s. This effort predated the SEC’s in-
dependence regulation and continued throughout the decade. 
Shareholders’ appointment of auditors was touted as increasing 
auditor independence from management. This attempt to deflect 
regulation of the profession had both an ethical and a technical 
or practical component. Alternatively stated, it had both a public 
and a private-interest aspect. The natural business year was the 
client-directed proposal that arose towards the end of the decade 
and was emphasized during the M&R audit failure testimony. 
There was no character or independence aspect in the discourse 
surrounding the natural business year. The proposal was framed 
purely as a technique that would improve audit quality. The 
transition from character to technique that is reflected in the 
discourse in the JA is also evinced in the nature of the other re-
forms the profession proposed.
Claims to legitimacy were on the cusp of change from the 
overtly moral, or principles-based, narrative of character to an 
objective scientific, or rules-based, narrative of technique. While 
character and technique are at opposite ends of the spectrum, 
the profession needed both character and technique to serve 
the public interest. To fulfill its social responsibilities, “knowl-
edge and courage are the stuff of which accountants must be 
made” [Shallenberger, 1939, p. 266]. While both character and 
technique elements are acknowledged, the technique element, 
knowledge, came first and the character element, courage, was 
the afterthought. Carey [1939c, p. 195] wrote in an 1939 edi-
torial that “the personal character and integrity of the auditor is 
the prime factor upon which the profession rests. There must, of 
course, be common standards of procedure, there must be defi-
nition of his legal responsibilities of the scope of his work, but 
the public should be constantly reminded that these are guides 
to better performance, not screens to conceal superficial work.”
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Character and integrity were still primal, thus identifying 
a central problem that could not be regulated away. Abbott’s 
[1998] contention that regulation is the most significant factor 
in the movement to use of the narrative of technique was evi-
denced in the accounting profession’s experience in the 1930s. 
Both the 1929 market crash and the M&R fraud focused such 
significant regulatory attention on the profession as to render 
adherence to the narrative of character untenable and to require 
adoption of the narrative of technique.
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aPPendiX a
rules of Professional Conduct
Adopted by the Council of the American Institute of Accountants with 
amendments in effect June 1931 [Richardson, 1931, pp. 155-159]
 (1) A firm or partnership, all of the individual members of which are 
members of the Institute (or in part members and in part associ-
ates, provided all the members of the firm are either members or 
associates), may describe itself as “Members of the American Insti-
tute of Accountants,” but a firm or partnership, all the individual 
members of which are not members of the Institute (or in part 
members and in part associates), or an individual practicing under 
a style demoting a partnership when in fact there be no partner or 
partners or a corporation or an individual or individuals practicing 
under a style demoting a corporate organization shall not use the 
designation “Members (or Associates) of the American Institute of 
Accountants.”
 (2) The preparation and certification of exhibits, statements, sched-
ules or other forms of accountancy work, containing an essential 
misstatement of fact or omission therefrom of such a fact as would 
amount to an essential misstatement of a failure to put prospective 
investors on notice in respect of an essential or material fact not 
specifically shown in the balance-sheet itself shall be, ipso facto, 
cause for expulsion or for such other discipline as the council may 
impose upon proper presentation of proof that such misstatement 
was either willful or the result of such gross negligence as to be 
inexcusable.
 (3) No member or associate shall allow any person to practice in his 
name as a public accountant who is not a member or an associate 
of the Institute or in partnership with him or in his employ on a 
salary.
 (4) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly allow or agree 
to allow a commission, brokerage or other participation by the 
laity in the fees or profits of his professional work; nor shall he ac-
cept directly or indirectly from the laity any commission, broker-
age or other participation for professional or commercial business 
turned over to others as an incident of his services to clients.
 (5) No member or associate shall engage in any business or occupa-
tion conjointly with that of a public accountant, which in the opin-
ion of the executive committee or of the council is incompatible or 
inconsistent therewith.
 (6) No member or associate shall certify to any accounts, exhibits, 
statements, schedules or other forms of accountancy work which 
have not been verified entirely under the supervision of himself, a 
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member of his firm, one of this staff, a member or an associate of 
this Institute or a member of a similar association of good stand-
ing in a foreign country which has been approved by the council.
 (7) No member or associate shall take part in any effort to secure the 
enactment or amendment of any state or federal law or of any 
regulation of any governmental or civic body, affecting the prac-
tice of the profession, without giving immediate notice thereof to 
the secretary of the Institute, who in turn shall at once advise the 
executive committee or the council.
 (8) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly solicit the 
clients or encroach upon the business of another member or asso-
ciate, but it is the right of any member or associate to give proper 
service and advice to those asking such service or advice.
 (9) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly offer employ-
ment to an employee of a fellow member or associate without first 
informing said fellow member or associate of his intent. This rule 
shall not be construed so as to inhibit negotiations with anyone 
who of his own initiative or in response to public advertisement 
shall apply to a member or an associate for employment.
(10) No member or associate shall render or offer to render profession-
al service, the fee for which shall be contingent upon his findings 
and the results thereof.
(11) No member or associate of the Institute shall advertise his other 
professional attainments or service through the mails, in the pub-
lic prints, by circular letters or by any other written word, except 
that a member or an associate may cause to be published in the 
public prints what is technically known as a card. A card is hereby 
defined as an advertisement of the name, title (member of the 
American Institute of Accountants, C.P.A., or other professional 
affiliation or designation), class of service and address of the ad-
vertiser, without any further qualifying words or letters, or in the 
case of announcement of change of address or personnel of firm 
the plain statement of the fact for the publication of which the 
announcement purports to be made. Cards permitted by this rule 
when appearing in newspapers shall not exceed two columns in 
width and three inches in depth; when appearing in magazines, 
directories and similar publications cards shall not exceed one 
quarter page in size. This rule shall not be construed to inhibit the 
proper and professional dissemination of impersonal information 
among member’s own clients or personal associates or the proper-
ly restricted circulation of firm bulletins containing staff personnel 
and professional information.
(12) No member or associate of the Institute shall be an officer, a direc-
tor, stockholder, representative, an agent, a teacher or lecturer, 
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nor participate in any other way in the activities or profits of any 
university, college or school which conducts its operations, solicits 
prospective students or advertises its course by methods which in 
the opinion of the committee on professional ethics are discredit-
able to the profession.
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